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ABSTRACT 
On the one hand we have nudging: a relatively new policy 
instrument that promises to be cheaper, less invasive and 
more effective. On the other hand we have pollution 
caused, among others by litter and energy waste due to 
inefficient appliances. The oceans are filled with 
disposable plastic bags, this forms a great threat to marine 
life and can even end up in our own seafood. What 
happens if we use nudging in order to tackle these issues, 
does it live up to it’s promise? Case studies of the plastic 
bag levy and energy efficiency label show that nudging 
can be a very effective tool, especially if it is embedded in 
a broader policy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Nudging is using people’s predictable irrationalities in 
order to guide them in a certain direction, without 
forbidding any options or significantly changing their 
incentives (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). A classic example 
is that an opt-out system brings about more organ donors 
than an opt-in system. Nudges usually alter the setting of 
a decision, the so-called choice architecture. And like an 
architect can increase interactions between people by 
creating open stairwells (Yeung, 2012), the order in which 
food is placed in a canteen influences what people pick 
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Nudging offers the 
possibility to guide people in a certain direction, whilst 
still leaving them the freedom to decide differently 
(Hansen, 2015). Nudging has been mentioned as a 
supplement or even an alternative to traditional regulation, 
since it has the potential to be cheaper, less invasive and 
more effective (Hansen, 2016).  Nudges usually work by 
using people’s predictable biases and habits, or by 
disrupting habits. Critique on nudging is, among others, 
uttered by Yeung (2012), however, this paper will 
demonstrate that nudging can be a very effective tool in 
fighting pollution, by elaborating on two case studies. The 
topic of the first case study is the Dutch plastic bag levy, 
installed in 2016 in order to curb plastic bag use. Although 
there has been debate on whether this is a nudge or a 
financial incentive, we will argue that it is a nudge. The 
second case study is about the European energy labelling 
program which aims to support the purchase of energy 
efficient household appliances. The main research 
question is: What is the effect of nudges and how can they 
be used to gently ´push´ people to behave more 
environmentally friendly?  
 
METHOD  
This paper is paper will analyze two practical examples of 
nudges. This holistic multiple-case study is designed as 
such that  the main results are expected to be similar in 
both cases, this method is called literal replication (Yin, 
2002). The case studies will separately analyze to what 
extent the effects of nudging mentioned in the start of this 
section are present in that specific case. Differences in 
results between the cases could point to important factors 
to take into account concerning nudging. The final 
conclusion is drawn from the cross case conclusions, where 
similar results strengthen the hypothesis. In every case, 
study references are made to multiple countries where 
similar laws are in place in order to draw from a bigger pool 
of data and get more reliable results. The two examples 
chosen where among a limited number of nudges that are 
explicitly endorsed by law, since most nudges are more 
subtle. The case studies are comparable because both 
nudges are mandated by law and work via businesses to 
consumers, aiming to adapt the latter’s behavior. The 
policies are mandated by the European Union and in effect 
in the Netherlands. Besides, both nudges aim to influence 
consumption, the plastic bag levy more at the counter, the 
energy labels when doing pre-purchase research as well as 
at the counter. In addition, both laws are linked to 
environmental policies.  
 
THE PLASTIC BAG LEVY 
Plastic Pollution  
Plastic bags are durable, resilient and strong. These same 
features that make them so popular for shoppers, are the 
ones that make them disastrous for the environment 
(Homonoff, 2012). The annual global production of plastic 
is around 300 million tons, half of which is disposed of after 
a single-use (Xanthos and Walker, 2017). In the European 
Union (EU) 98,6 billion plastic carrier bags were used in 
2010, this boils down to more than one bag a day per 
household (BIO Intelligence Service, 2011). The Dutch rate 
is a little below the European average, since the 3 billion 
bags yearly used (Rijksoverheid, 2016) come down to 170 
bags per person per year. On average, single-use plastic 
bags are used for 12 minutes, before being disposed of 
(Environment Protection Authority, 2016). They cause 
major problems by leaching chemicals, clogging storm 
drains, posing a threat to the marine environment and plastic 
particles even end up in our diet through the seafood and 
accumulate in our bodies in a process of biomagnification 
(BIO Intelligence Service, 2011). Accumulation of plastics 
is exacerbated since plastics take up to 1000 years to break 
down (Clapp & Swanston, 2009). Plastic debris accounts for 
60 – 80 % of marine litter and results in plastic gyres like 
the Great Pacific Garbage Patch. Entanglement of species 
by marine debris can cause starvation, suffocation, reduced 
reproductive success and death (Bio Intelligence service, 
2011).  
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The levy  
There has been a global pattern of efforts to restrict the use 
of disposable plastic bags and tackle the issue at the roots, 
often in the form of a levy or even a total ban. Ireland was 
the first country to impose a levy  instead of an outright ban. 
Consumers had to pay a €0.15 tax in 2002, increased to 
€0.22 in 2007, for each bag. This led to a dramatic 94 
percent decrease in consumption in the first year 
(Homonoff, 2012). In the Netherlands, a levy  was installed 
following European Directive 2015/720. The Regeling 
Beheer Verpakkingen (2016) prohibits shopkeepers to give 
out free plastic bags. A levy was preferred over other types 
of legislation because it was expected to be effective, while 
it has a minimum negative effect on society in terms of 
inconvenience and administrative burden. A ban would 
merely preclude shops from giving the service of 
providing a plastic bag, while under this regulation shops 
can still provide a bag for a minor fee, and the fee can 
contribute to their revenues. This motivates shops to 
charge the fee instead of providing an alternative kind of 
bag, and to obey the regulation (Mansveld, 2015).   
 
The underlying mechanisms (or: why the levy works)  
 
A plastic bag charge can be considered as an economic 
instrument that incorporates negative externalities into the 
household budget. In essence the law does not constitute a 
tax, but compels the retailer to charge the customer 
directly for the bags, instead of including the cost in the 
price of other goods. Since the consumer already indirectly 
paid the costs, the law has more effect on the framing of 
the costs than on the actual costs (Jakovcevic et al., 2014). 
That the levy mostly frames the costs is in line with 
Homonoff’s (2012) conclusion that a levy or a loss of 5 
cents has a much bigger effect than a 5-cent bonus. The 
next paragraph will set forth why that is the case. 
Moreover, the 5-cent fee that most shops charge is a 
relatively minor added costs and not a very strong 
economic incentive. That the levy is a nudge, rather than 
an economic incentive, is underlined by research pointing 
out that it has more effect on higher income classes than 
on low income classes (Rivers et al., 2017). 
 
The probability of abandonment of plastic carrier bags is 
higher when they are given away for free (Bio Intelligence 
Service, 2011). Oddly, even a small charge of 5 cents 
could alter the perception of plastic bags from a free 
commodity to something worth reusing. Other 
mechanisms at play are the change in default option, 
change in choice architecture and loss aversion.  
 
Before January 2016, customers often received the plastic 
bag as a default. “Do you want a bag with that? “ was an 
often heard question in stores. While after the levy came 
into effect, the question is “can you carry it like this?” The 
levy obliged customers to make an active choice and 
explicitly approve or request a bag, creating a choice 
moment where one was previously lacking (Jakovcevic et 
al., 2014). Moreover it framed the choice in a way that 
enabled people to act more environmental friendly, 
without having to decline anything. Besides, this small 
change at the counter acts as a ‘habit disruptor’ (Poortinga, 
Sautkina, Thomas & Wolstenholme, 2016), activating  
more conscious thinking and enabling people to find new 
routines (Poortinga et al., 2016). 
Loss Aversion  
 
Neoclassical economic theory suggests that financial 
incentives will be effective if the incentive for changing 
behavior is bigger than the costs an individual associates 
with changing his behavior. Financial incentives can either 
take the form of a fee or a bonus, and according to standard 
economic theory individuals should respond similarly to 
the two types, provided that they are the same amount 
(Homonoff, 2012). However, research points out that 
people are loss averse, meaning that they perceive losses 
more strongly than gains of the same size (Field, 2009 and 
Hossain & List, 2009). The pattern of loss 
aversion established in those experiments implies that a 
fee would be more effective than a bonus of the same size. 
Homonoff (2012) evaluated two policies in the Washington 
Metropolitan Area aimed at reducing the use of disposable 
bags: a 5-cent tax on disposable bag use and a 5-cent bonus 
for reusable bag use. In stores that offer no incentive, 84 
percent of customers use one or more disposable bags. 
While 82 percent of customers in stores that offer a bonus 
used disposable bags, only 39 percent of customers in tax 
stores used disposable bags. These results are visualized in 
the figure below. 
 
These results suggest that while a tax has a substantial 
impact, causing over 50 percent decrease in disposable bag 
use, a bonus of the same amount has almost no effect on 
behavior, which is consistent with the model of loss 
aversion (Homonoff, 2012). Therefore, a policy or a nudge 
that charges customers a small amount is more effective 
than a bonus that rewards customers.  
 
The effect of the levy 
 
In the Netherlands, a study commissioned by the Dutch 
ministry of infrastructure and environment concluded that 
the use of plastic bags has decreased by 71% compared to 
pre-levy years (SAMR, 2017). When compared to for 
example 2014, when 25 million kilos of plastic bags were 
used (TNS NIPO 2014) a decrease of 71 % would amount 
to a reduction of 17.750.000 kilos of plastic. However, one 
limitation of the Dutch levy is that plastic bags are partially 
substituted by paper bags.  
 
Ireland was the first to introduce a tax of €0,15 on plastic 
bags in 2002. This tax had an immediate effect on consumer 
behaviour with a decrease in annual plastic bag usage from 
an estimated 328 bags per person to 21 bags per person 
(European Environmental Agency, 2016). In other words, 
use decreased by 90 – 95% in a very short period of time 
(Clapp and Swanston, 2009). The success of the tax in 
Ireland was partly attributable to its popularity following an 
advertising awareness campaign and the public recognition 
of its success (Dikgang, Leiman & Visser, 2012). After 
research in Ireland, Convery et al. (2007) nominated the 
levy as the most popular tax in Europe. In 1999 only 8% of 
the Irish was reported to be willing to pay €0,15 for a plastic 
bag, in 2003 this increased to 91%. Research in the United 
Kingdom shows a similar increase in acceptance and 
positivity towards the levy. The levy there resulted in a 85% 
decrease in plastic bag use. (Poortinga et al. 2016).   
Figure 1: Homonoff 2012, p.78 
 In short, the minor fee of the levy is not a significant 
economic value. However, the charge still results in a 
massive decrease in bag use, like the decrease of 71% in 
the Netherlands. The levy creates a choice moment where 
it was previously lacking, and can change the default 
option. Moreover, since humans tend to be loss averse, a 
levy of 5 cents works, whereas a bonus of five cents does 
not. This supports the claim that the levy is effective 
because it changes choice architecture, rather than because 
of its economic value.  
 
ENERGY LABELS 
Each year, millions of household appliances with different 
degrees of efficiency are purchased. The energy efficiency 
paradox postulates that decision makers may fail to invest 
in energy-efficient technologies (EETs) even though these 
appear to pay off under prevailing market conditions 
(Schleich, Gassmann, Faure & Meissner, 2016). 
Inefficient technology leads to extra energy costs, and a 
waste of global resources. Fully adopting the EETs that 
exist today could lower projected U.S. energy use by 25% 
to 31% by 2030 (Vaidyanathan et al., 2013). 
The European Union has a two-sided approach with, on 
the one hand, minimum standards for product efficiency 
as set forth in the ecodesign regulations and framework 
directive 2009/125/EC , and, on the other hand, regulation 
2017/1369 requiring labels and standard product 
information to be shown at sales of major household 
appliances . The European style energy label shows a scale 
of colors and grades and places the product on the scale on 
basis of its energy efficiency. It provides a mechanism for 
customers to compare devices in the same product group 
on the basis of their efficiency (Vaidyanathan et al., 2013).  
Moreover, the label allows industry to transform 
environmental challenges into economic opportunities 
(European Commission, 2015). The most recent 
regulation added rules to rescale the label, since over the 
years new categories up until A+++ had to be added due 
to an increase in efficiency, which made the label less 
effective (Regulation 2017/1369).  
The underlying mechanisms (or: why the levy works) 
Although information provision appeals to one’s ratio, it 
can also function as a nudge. A lack of time and necessary 
expertise, combined with cognitive limits and a latent 
information overload makes it difficult for individuals to 
assess information properly. Moreover, non-rational 
factors have major impact on the way information is 
processed. A traditional approach would focus on the 
information itself, whereas a policy inspired by behavioral 
science pays attention to the way in which the information 
is conveyed, like the design of the label (Baisch, 2016). 
The label nudges in two ways, first of all the design takes 
behavioral insights into account. Second of all, it provides 
a counterweight for the present bias, and compels 
consumers to take energy efficiency into account. 
Research points out that the label is easy to grasp and gives 
a good overview due to the alphabetical scales and colors. 
Moreover, the scales allow for comparability (Baisch, 
2016). A scale from A to G is more effective than a scale 
from A+++ to D. Even though the steps in energy 
efficiency are equal, the difference between A and B is 
perceived as bigger than the difference between A++ and 
A+++ (LE London Economics & IPSOS, 2014).  This 
shows that that the framing is information is important to 
take into account. Therefore the current rankings will be 
phased out, and the new grading system will revert back to 
the A to G rankings (Article 11, regulation 2017/1369).  
Often, more efficient appliances cost no more upfront than 
less efficient models. Even for appliances with an initial cost 
premium energy bill savings often offset and exceed the 
incremental purchase price. However, humans often 
struggle to take future costs into account, due to the present 
bias. The present bias means that people value current 
benefits more than - higher -  future benefits. Therefore, 
consumers tend to attach more value to the initial expenses 
than to life cycle costs. For investments in EETs this means 
that a consumer is not willing to pay as much now for higher 
cost-savings in the future. The degree to which each 
individual discounts future benefits is called implicit 
discount rate (IDR) (Vaidyanathan et al., 2013).  Energy 
labels act on the IDR on several fronts. First of all, they 
might work as reminder of someone’s pre-existing pro-
environmental attitudes, and nudge them to take these into 
account in the purchase decision. While, in principle, 
bounded rationality could increase as well as decrease IDR, 
empirical literature suggests that it mostly impedes the 
adoption of EETs (Schleich, et al., 2016). The easily 
understandable label rankings counter humanity’s bounded 
rationality on the topic of energy efficiency. Whereas 
beforehand households may have considered the purchasing 
price rather than lifetime costs, labels draw the attention to 
future energy use and motivate consumers to take related 
energy costs into account (Schleich, et al., 2016). Allcott 
and Mullainathan (2010) argue that there is much to win by 
applying a more behavioral inspired policy into the field of 
energy use. The ecodesign sets minimum standards for 
energy products, while the label compares and grades the 
products, both in terms of efficiency. These two policies 
supplement each other, as shown in figure 2 (European 
Commission, 2015). 
The effect of the label  
Over time, appliances have become much more efficient, 
but it is hard to trace back how much of this development is 
caused by the labels. However, in case of vacuum cleaners, 
a product that only recently got regulated by eco-design and 
labeling, energy use per product was rather increasing than 
decreasing, without improving in functionality.  
Research done by the European Union estimates that the 
eco-design and energy labeling measures in place save 175  
mtoe (2,04 ∗ 1010 MWH) primary energy per year in 2020 
(European Commission, 2015, p.15). An estimated 20% of 
consumers would buy more efficient products due to an 
improved label (Vaidyanathan et al., 2013).  
 
Figure 2 The combined effect (EU impact assessment, 2015, p.12) 
DISCUSSION 
A lot of sources were available to research the plastic bag 
levy, however, most of the research was done outside of the 
Netherlands,  while the initial aim was to study the Dutch 
levy.  In this paper, it is assumed that findings about why the 
levy works from the UK, Ireland and the US can be extended 
to the Netherlands.  
When discussing the results of the labelling program, a 
major limitation is that most of the information about 
Europe comes from research done for the European 
Commission, which is part of the institution that installed 
the rules, and may therefore be less objective. 
Unfortunately, this study had to rely on this information 
since the availability of other sources was very limited.  
 
CONCLUSION 
As said in the method section, similar results in both case 
studies strengthen each other. In both cases, the measures 
qualify as nudges, since they do not limit or significantly 
change consumers incentives (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). 
Results show that a very minor charge and some extra 
information can have a lot of impact. Especially in times 
were pollution and a waste of resources is such a hot topic, 
it is important to research how these kind of non-coercive 
methods can play a big role. Moreover, this research shows 
that behavioral insights, like loss aversion, should be taken 
into account to make policies more effective.  
 
ROLE OF THE STUDENT  
Tamara Houweling was an undergraduate Liberal Arts & 
Sciences student working under the supervision of Philip 
Paiement. The student independently came up with the idea 
of a case study about nudges and the plastic bag levy. The 
supervisor proposed to incorporate energy labels. The 
research and was done by the student, and where needed 
discussed with the supervisor.  
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